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The United States Constitution Allows a State to
Limit the Right of a Criminal Defendant to
Represent Himself at Trial on the Ground of a Lack
of Mental Competence: Indiana v. Edwards
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -

CRIMINAL LAW -

MENTAL COMPETENCE

The United States Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant who has been deter-

-

RIGHT OF SELF-REPRESENTATION -

mined competent to stand trial is not necessarily competent to
represent himself at trial and can therefore be prevented from doing so by the State.
Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S.Ct. 2379 (2008).
Respondent, Ahmad Edwards ("Edwards"), attempted to steal a
pair of shoes from a department store in Indiana in July of 1999.1
A sales associate at the store witnessed Edwards acting suspiciously and called Ryan Martin ("Martin"), a loss prevention officer at the store. 2 Martin, watching Edwards on the store's surveillance system, saw him put a pair of shoes into a bag and exit the
store. 3 Martin then followed Edwards out of the store, stopped
him on the street, and explained that he was a security officer.4 A
struggle ensued, during which Edwards fired several shots, injur5
ing Martin and a bystander.
Edwards was caught and subsequently charged with attempted
murder, battery with a deadly weapon, criminal recklessness, and
theft.6 At trial, Edwards's mental condition was called into question, resulting in three competency hearings and two requests for
1. Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 2382 (2008) (hereinafter "EdwardsIIf').
2. Edwards v. Indiana, 854 N.E.2d 42, 45 (Ind.App. 2006) (hereinafter "Edwards f'),
affd in part and superseded in part, remanded, 866 N.E.2d 252 (Ind.2007), vacated, remanded, 128 S. Ct. 2379 (2008). The store in question was the Parisian Department Store
in downtown Indianapolis. EdwardsI, 854 N.E.2d at 45.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. Edwards was eventually subdued and apprehended by Thomas Flynn, an FBI
agent who was coincidentally in the area when the shots were fired. Id. at 45-46.
6. Edwards III, 128 S. Ct. at 2382. Edwards's charges, all felonies, are more specifically described, under Indiana law, as class A felony murder, class C felony battery with a
deadly weapon, class D felony criminal recklessness, and class D felony theft. Edwards I,
854 N.E.2d at 45.
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self-representation, which formed the backdrop for what eventually became the key issue in the United States Supreme Court
7
opinion arising from this case.
In August of 2000, Edwards's court-appointed legal counsel requested a psychiatric evaluation in order to determine his competency to stand trial.8 Edwards was found incompetent to stand
trial and was committed to a state hospital for evaluation and
treatment. 9 Edwards's condition appeared to improve over the
next several months and his doctors determined that he was competent to stand trial. 10 However, before trial, Edwards's attorney
requested another psychiatric evaluation, which resulted in a second competency hearing wherein Edwards was found competent to
stand trial despite suffering from an unspecified mental illness.1
Edwards's attorney requested yet another psychiatric evaluation
several months later, and a third competency hearing was held in
April of 2003.12 The court eventually concluded that Edwards was
not competent to stand trial, and he was recommitted to the state

hospital.

13

Several months later, doctors at the hospital determined that
Edwards's condition had improved enough that he was again competent to stand trial. 14 On the eve of his trial, Edwards asked to
represent himself and requested a continuance in order to prepare
to proceed to trial pro se. 15 The court refused to issue the continuance, and Edwards proceeded to trial with his court-appointed
counsel. 16 Edwards was subsequently convicted of criminal recklessness and theft. 17 The jury failed to reach a verdict on the attempted murder and battery charges, and a second trial was held
on those charges.' 8 However, immediately before this second trial,

7. EdwardsIII, 128 S. Ct. at 2382.
8. Id.
9. Id. The findings were based on witness testimony from a psychiatrist and a neuropsychologist. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Edwards III, 128 S. Ct. at 2382.
13. Id. This third competency hearing included the testimony of a psychiatrist who
stated that, although Edwards could understand the charges against him, his schizophrenia prevented him from being able to cooperate with his counsel. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. "Pro se" is defined as "[flor oneself; on one's own behalf; without a lawyer."
BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1258 (8th ed. 2004).
16. EdwardsIII, 128 S. Ct. at 2382.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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Edwards again asked to proceed pro se. 19 The court, finding Edwards competent to stand trial but not competent to defend himself, denied this request. 20 Edwards, represented by appointed
21
counsel, was then convicted of the remaining charges.
Edwards appealed to the Indiana Court of Appeals, arguing that
the trial court erred in denying his request for self-representation
at his second trial and that the error deprived him of his right to
self-representation under the Sixth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. 22 The appellate court found in Edwards's favor and ordered a new trial.23 The State of Indiana then appealed
24
to the Indiana Supreme Court, and the appeal was granted.
Although finding the trial court's ruling "reasonable" for purposes of ensuring Edwards a fair trial, the Indiana Supreme Court
affirmed the court of appeals' ruling on the basis that precedent
from the United States Supreme Court held that the standard for
competency to represent oneself at trial is equivalent to that of
competency to stand trial.25 The State then petitioned the United
States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted,
to consider the constitutional issue of whether the trial court was
required to allow Edwards to represent himself at trial.26 The
Court, in a 7-2 decision, vacated the judgment of the Supreme
27
Court of Indiana and remanded the case.
Justice Breyer delivered the majority opinion. 28 The Court explained that, while existing Court precedent helped frame the issue in the case, those prior cases had not yet directly addressed
it.29 Citing Dusky v. United States30 and Drope v. Missouri,3' the
19. Id.
20. Id. at 2382-83.
21. Edwards III, 128 S. Ct. at 2383.
22. Id. See also EdwardsI, 854 N.E.2d at 46. The Sixth Amendment states that:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

23. Edwards III, 128 S. Ct. at 2383.
24. Edwards v. Indiana, 866 N.E.2d 252, 254 (Ind.
vacated, remanded 128 S. Ct. 2379 (2008).
25. Edwards II, 866 N.E. 2d at 260.
26. Edwards III, 128 S. Ct. at 2283.
27. Id. at 2388.
28. Id. at 2381.
29. Id. at 2383.
30. 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam). In Dusky, the
set forth the standard for mental competency to stand
stand trial under this new standard, a defendant must

2007) (hereinafter "Edwards IF'),

Supreme Court, for the first time,
trial. Id. at 402-03. In order to
have "sufficient present ability to

444

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 47

Court stated that the Constitution does not allow a person who
lacks "mental competency" to stand trial. 32 However, as the Court
pointed out, neither Dusky nor Drope examined the relationship
between the standard of mental competence to stand trial and the
right to represent oneself at trial.3 3 In addition, in Farettav. California,34 the United States Supreme Court held that the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution guarantee the right
to stand trial without counsel so long as a criminal defendant decides to do so both voluntarily and intelligently. 35 As Justice
Breyer explained, however, Faretta did not provide an answer to
the question before the Court in Edwards III because Faretta did
not consider the issue of mental competency, since Faretta was
"literate, competent, and understanding," and because the case
"made it clear" that the right to represent oneself is not absolute. 36
The majority explained that only one case existed, Godinez v.
Moran,37 in which the Court considered both mental competence
and self-representation. 38 In Godinez, according to the Court, the
criminal defendant, who was "borderline-competent," requested
the trial court to allow him to represent himself solely for the purpose of changing his pleas from "not guilty" to "guilty."39 The trial
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding" and must also
have "a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him." Id.
31. 420 U.S. 162 (1975). The Supreme Court, in the Drope opinion, altered the Dusky
standard by holding that a defendant must not only be able to understand the nature an
object of the proceedings against him and be able to consult with counsel but also must be
able "to assist in preparing his defense" in order to stand trial. Id. at 171.
32. Edwards III, 128 S. Ct. at 2383. Dusky defines the standard of competency as both
"(1) 'whether' the defendant has 'a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him' and (2) whether the defendant has 'sufficient present ability to consult
with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding."' Id. at 2383 (quoting
Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402.) (emphasis in original).
33. Edwards II, 128 S. Ct. at 2383.
34. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
35. Edwards III, 128 S. Ct. at 2383. The Supreme Court implied the constitutional
right to voluntarily and intelligently elect to proceed without counsel from:
(1) a "nearly universal conviction," made manifest in state law, that "forcing a lawyer
upon an unwilling defendant is contrary to his basic right to defend himself if he
truly wants to do so," (2) Sixth Amendment language granting rights to the "accused;" (3) Sixth Amendment structure indicating that the rights it sets forth, related
to the "fair administration of American justice," are "persona[l]" to the accused, (4)
the absence of historical examples of forced representation and (5) "respect for the
individual."'
Id. (citations omitted, emphasis in original).
36. Id. at 2384. Additional cases holding that self-representation is not an absolute
right include Martinez v. Cal. Ct. App. 4d, 528 U.S. 152 (2000) and McKaskle v. Wiggins,
465 U.S. 168 (1984).
37. 509 U.S. 389 (1993).
38. EdwardsIII, 128 S. Ct. at 2384.
39. Id.
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court granted the defendant's request, but a federal appellate
court vacated the guilty pleas, holding that the Constitution required the trial court to inquire whether the defendant was com40
petent to waive his right to counsel before granting his request.
According to the appellate court, the standard for this determination was higher than the standard of competency to stand trial as
set forth in Dusky. 4 1 The United States Supreme Court reversed
the court of appeals in Godinez on the ground that the decision to
waive counsel does not require a different or higher level of mental
42
ability than the decision to waive any other Constitutional right.
Furthermore, the decision to waive counsel is no more difficult of a
decision than any other decision that a represented defendant
would have to make during a trial.43 In addition, the Court distinguished the level of competence required of a defendant to
waive the right to counsel from the level of competence to repre44
sent himself.
The Supreme Court, in Edwards III, noted the similarities to
Godinez45 but nonetheless determined that Godinez did not conclusively answer the question before it.46 The crucial difference
between the two cases, the Court held, was that, in Edwards III,
Edwards sought to actually represent himself throughout the
course of a trial, while the defendant in Godinez merely sought to
change his pleas from "not guilty" to "guilty."47 In addition, the
Edwards III Court explained that, in Godinez, the State sought to
permit the defendant to proceed pro se, while, in Edwards III, the
48
State sought to prevent the defendant from representing himself.
49
As a result, the question before the Court remained open.
Justice Breyer then turned to examining the central issue of
Edwards III, which was whether the United States Constitution
40. Id. (citing Godinez, 509 U.S. at 393-94).
41. Id. at 2384 (citing Godinez, 509 U.S. at 393-94).
42. Id. (citing Godinez, 509 U.S. at 399).
43. Edwards III, 128 S. Ct. at 2384 (citing Godinez, 509 U.S. at 398).
44. Id. (citing Godinez, 509 U.S. at 399).
45. Id. at 2385. The Court noted:
Both [cases] involve mental confidence and self-representation. Both involve a defendant who wants to represent himself. Both involve a mental condition that falls in
a gray area between Dusky's minimal constitutional requirement that measures a defendant's ability to stand trial and a somewhat higher standard that measures mental fitness for another legal purpose.
Id. at 2385.
46. Id.
47. Edwards III, 128 S. Ct. at 2385.
48. Id. at 2384.
49. Id.
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allows a State to limit the right of a criminal defendant, who is
competent enough to stand trial and wishes to represent himself
at trial, from representing himself on the ground that he lacks the
mental capacity to do so. 50 To this question, the majority an51
swered yes.
To support its holding, the Court first determined that, while
precedent did not actually answer this question, it pointed toward
a positive answer. 52 The Supreme Court cases that had examined
the issue of "mental competency," Breyer wrote, established a
standard which centered on a defendant's ability to consult presently with counsel. 53 The Court held that the standard assumes
representation by legal counsel and therefore suggests that, in a
situation where a defendant has decided to proceed without counsel, different circumstances would exist and a different standard
would therefore be required. 54 In addition, as the Court noted, the
holding in Faretta was based in part on the established state law
notion that self-representation is subject to a competency limitation, such as in circumstances where the defendant's mental incapacity was so severe or unique that it would deprive him of a fair
55
trial.
The majority went on to state that mental illness varies by degree and by time, as evidenced in part by the history of examinations, commitments, and hearings regarding Edwards's own competency to stand trial. 56 Given this variation in degree, the Court
held that it is possible for a defendant to satisfy the Dusky standard for competence to stand trial, while failing to maintain the
57
competence to defend himself without the assistance of counsel.
58
This conclusion, the Court explained, is common sense.
Next, the majority determined that the right of selfrepresentation at trial under these circumstances would not affirm the dignity of the defendant but rather could damage it, given
50. Id. at 2385-86.
51. Id. at 2386.
52. Edwards III, 128 S. Ct. at 2386.
53. Id. (citing Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402; Drope, 420 U.S. at 171).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 2386. See Faretta,422 U.S. at 813; Cappetta v. State, 204 So. 2d 913, 917-18
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967), rev'd on other grounds at 216 So.2d 749 (Fla. 1968), Allen v.
Commonwealth, 87 N.E.2d 192, 195 (Mass. 1949).
56. Id. at 2386.
57. Edwards I1, 128 S. Ct. at 2387. The Court based this determination, in part, on an
amicus brief filed by the American Psychiatric Association, as well as motions and other
documents filed by the defendant in the lower courts. Id.
58. Id.
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the "spectacle" that could potentially take place in the courtroom. 59 In addition, because the defendant's incompetence would
likely lead to an improper conviction or improper sentence, selfrepresentation in such circumstances would be in direct conflict
with the Constitution's fundamental objective of providing a fair
trial. 60 The Court stated that it is not only important that the
trial be fair, but also that it appear fair to the observer. 6 1 According to the Court, the task of determining whether allowing a defendant to represent himself would appear fair to observers is best
62
left to the discretion of the trial judge.
In conclusion, the Court held that the Constitution allows trial
judges to determine a defendant's mental capacity to conduct his
own defense at trial, and that states are constitutionally permitted to insist upon representation for defendants who are competent enough to stand trial but not competent enough to defend
themselves. 63 The Court then declined the State of Indiana's request to adopt a more specific standard by which to measure a defendant's incompetence to represent himself, deeming the question
both unnecessary and difficult to determine. 64 The State's request
to overrule Faretta,which Indiana argued had led to unfair trials,
was also declined. 65 Pro se defendants in felony cases, the Court
explained, were actually less likely to be convicted of felonies than
their represented counterparts and concerns about the fairness of
pro se trials are concentrated on the small percentage of cases
66
where the mental competence of the defendant is also at issue.
The Court stated that the ruling in the case before it would allow
judges to deal with such cases and would help curtail concerns
about such trials remaining fair. 67 The Court vacated the Indiana
Supreme Court's ruling and remanded the case for further pro68
ceedings.
Writing in dissent, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, argued that a defendant who has been determined to be competent
to stand trial and who is competent to waive counsel has a Consti59. Id.
60. Id. at 2387. See also U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
61. Id. at 2386 (quoting Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160 (1988)).
62. Edwards III, 128 S. Ct. at 2386.
63. Id. at 2387-88.
64. Id. at 2388.
65. Id.
66. Id. (citing Erica J. Hashimoto, Defending the Right of Self-Representation: An EmpiricalLook at the Pro Se Felony Defendant, 85 N.C. L. REV. 423 (2007)).
67. Edwards III, 128 S. Ct. at 2388.
68. Id.
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tutional right to represent himself at trial.69 In other words, a
State, Justice Scalia argued, cannot force a lawyer upon an unwilling defendant. 70
Justice Scalia reiterated that a defendant who waives his right
to counsel must do so both knowingly and intelligently and must
make the decision consciously and with an awareness of the dangers and potential consequences of doing so. 71 Although some
mentally ill defendants may not be capable of waiving this right
knowingly or intelligently, Edwards, the dissent stated, is not
such a defendant. 72 Rather, Edwards was warned extensively by
the trial judge of the risks of representing himself, and the trial
judge found that Edwards's waiver had, in fact, come knowingly
and intelligently. 73 Justice Scalia then stated that the Constitution protects the right of an individual like Edwards, a pro se defendant who has voluntarily waived counsel, to represent himself
even when doing so may harm his case. 74 A defendant has the
right, Justice Scalia explained, to use whatever arguments he sees
75
fit in his defense, regardless of how ineffective they may be.
The dissent declared that a State has no right to deny a constitutional protection based on its own view of what is fair.76 Justice
Scalia argued that the purpose of the rights established by the
Sixth Amendment is to ensure a fair trial, but that does not mean
that those rights can be ignored in order to ensure a fair trial is
achieved.7 7 The right of self-representation, the dissent would
have held, is a constitutional guarantee to be afforded the same
respect and protection as all other such guarantees. 78 The only
time a defendant can be deprived of this right is that rare time
when other similar rights can also be denied, which is when such
a deprival is necessary to allow the trial to proceed in an orderly
manner.7 9 As the dissent pointed out, however, because Edwards
was not allowed to proceed pro se, he obviously could not have exhibited any behavior that could be characterized as obstructionist
69. Id. at 2394 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 2390-91.
71. Id. at 2391 (citing Faretta,422 U.S. at 835).
72. Edwards HI, 128 S. Ct. at 2391 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 2391.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Edwards III, 128 S. Ct. at 2391 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 145 (2006)).
78. Id.
79. Id.
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or abusive of the dignity of the courtroom.8 0 Even in circumstances where a court has been allowed to appoint standby counsel, the dissent explained, the defendant has still been allowed to
control the management of his defense and substantially act as his
81
own attorney.
Justice Scalia reasoned that, even if he did believe in allowing
courts to disregard a defendant's right for the purpose of accomplishing the ultimate goal that right was intended to reach, he
would still dissent from the majority because, as he believed, the
82
majority's determination of the nature of the goal was incorrect.
For Justice Scalia, the loss of dignity, which the right of selfrepresentation seeks to prevent, is not that of a defendant humiliating himself at trial, but rather being denied the freedom of individual choice and the ability to determine one's own fate.8 3 In addition, the dissent explained, the Court has never denied a right
because it would make the trial appear unfair to observers, and
this case did not provide an opportunity to impose such a stan84
dard.
Next, the dissent considered the possibility that the majority
was unsure that the right of self-representation is actually guaranteed by the Constitution.8 5 Justice Scalia wrote that, while the
Sixth Amendment does not explicitly mention the right to proceed
pro se, it provides the defendant, and not the defendant's counsel,
the right to carry out his defense. 86 Of course, attorneys are allowed full authority to manage a criminal trial, and so, in order for
the defendant to actually exercise this right in cases where counsel has fully managed a defense, Justice Scalia argued, the defendant must have actually consented to representation.8 7 The dissent noted that Edwards did not consent to the appointment of
counsel and was therefore prevented from actually defending himself.88 Justice Scalia supported this contention by noting that Edwards's attorney made different arguments in his defense than
those preferred by Edwards.8 9
80. Id.
81. Id. See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984).
82. Edwards III, 128 S. Ct. at 2393 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 2393-94.
87. EdwardsIII, 128 S. Ct. at 2394 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
88. Id.
89. Id. Edwards had wanted to argue self-defense but his counsel argued lack of intent.
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Finally, Justice Scalia criticized the majority's holding as vague
because it held only that a lack of mental competence may allow
for the denial of the right of self-representation. 90 Although admitting that the holding would likely gain substantial meaning in
the future, he argued that its present indeterminacy could lead to
judges avoiding the hassles of dealing with the pleadings and arguments of borderline mentally ill patients by simply finding them
incompetent to proceed pro se and appointing them counsel. 91
As a case of first impression for the Supreme Court, existing
precedent helped frame the case's central question but failed to
provide an answer to the question before it.92 There were two distinct and major issues in the case: the Constitution's "mental
competence" standard and the scope of the right to selfrepresentation. 93 The Supreme Court looked to case law on those
94
issues in order to resolve Edwards III.
It is a longstanding belief of American jurisprudence that a person who does not meet at least a basic level of mental competence
may not be subjected to stand trial. 95 While the notion of competency to stand trial was carried over to the American courts from
British common law, the issue appears to have been first formally
considered at the federal appellate level in Youtsey v. United
States96 in 1899. 97 In Youtsey, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit, having examined in detail the common law of
Britain and the American States, held that it is a fundamental
truth that an insane person cannot enter a plea, be subject to trial,
receive judgment, or be sentenced. 98 In Youtsey, the criminal defendant had petitioned for a continuance on the grounds that he
was suffering from both epilepsy and a "nonsane mind and memory." 99 The petition was denied by the trial court and the defendant appealed. 100 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit considered the dual issues of whether or not the court erred in denying the petition, given the defendant's epilepsy and mental compe90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Edwards III, 128 S. Ct. at 2383 (majority opinion).
93. Id. at 2394.
94. Id.
95. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975).
96. 97 F. 937 (6th Cir. 1899).
97. Id. at 940-48.
98. Id. at 940.
99. Id. at 939-40. The opinion does not clearly state with what crime the defendant
was charged. See id.
100. Id.
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tency, without first taking steps to determine whether the defendant was mentally fit to stand trial.101
While characterizing the defendant's epilepsy as a physical condition that may have made conducting the trial difficult, the court
quickly determined that the trial court's decision to proceed was
within its discretion. 10 2 The circuit court then turned to the second issue of mental competence, stating that, because no statutory
law existed on point, it must look to the common law.10 3 The court
examined a number of British cases, state cases, and other sources
to determine the proper procedure for dealing with potentially
mentally incompetent defendants. 10 4 Applying the common law
majority view that the issue of a defendant's sanity should be examined by the trial court before proceeding to trial, the court determined it was error to have denied the continuance without first
taking steps to determine whether the defendant was competent
105
to stand trial.
While Youtsey may have merely restated the traditional common law view of competency to stand trial, the modern standard of
mental competence was created and fine-tuned by two United
States Supreme Court cases, Dusky v. United States10 6 and Drope
v. Missouri.10 7 In a very short opinion that did not delve into the
facts of the case, the Supreme Court of the United States first established the standard for mental competency to stand trial in
Dusky. 0 8 The Court, agreeing with the opinion of the Solicitor
General, held that mere orientation to time and place and the ability to recall some events is insufficient to establish the necessary
competency. 109 Rather, in order to be competent to stand trial, a
criminal defendant must have "sufficient present ability to consult
with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding" and must also have "a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him." 110 The Supreme Court elabo-

101. Youtsey, 97 F. at 940.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 940-44. These sources included, but were not limited to: 1 Hale, P.C. 35;
Reg. v. Berry, 1 Q.B. 447; 2 Bish. Cr. Proc. § 666; Frith's Case, 22 How. St. Tr. 307; State v.
Reed, 7 So. 231 (La. 1889); Youtsey, 97 F. at 940-44.
105. Youtsey, 97 F. at 947.
106. 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam).
107. 420 U.S. 162 (1975).
108. Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402-03.
109. Id. at 402.
110. Id.
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rated on this standard in Pate v. Robinson,"' in which it held that
failing to protect a defendant from being tried or convicted while
incompetent to stand trial is a deprivation of the due process right
to a fair trial.1 2 The Dusky standard remained otherwise unaltered for nearly fifteen years, until Drope reached the Supreme
3
Court in 1975.1
In Drope, the defendant-petitioner had been convicted of raping
his wife and sentenced to life imprisonment. 1 4 The defendant appealed on the grounds that his constitutional rights had been violated by the state trial court's failure to order a psychiatric examination before trial" 5 and for conducting part of the trial in the defendant's absence. 116 The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the
trial court's ruling on both issues, subsequently prompting the
defendant-petitioner to file a motion to vacate the judgment and
sentence, pursuant to a State procedural rule."1 7 A hearing was
held on the motion and, despite the testimony of two psychiatrist
witnesses that the petitioner was likely not competent to stand
trial, the motion was denied."18 The ruling was affirmed on appeal by the Missouri Court of Appeals. 1 9 The Supreme Court of

111. 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
112. Pate, 383 U.S. at 385. In Pate, the State argued that, although the defendant was
incompetent, he had "waived" the competency defense by failing to request a competency
hearing prior to trial. Pate, 383 U.S. at 384. However, the Court held that it was contradictory to argue that an incompetent person could knowingly waive a right to a competency
hearing. Id.
113. Drope, 420 U.S. at 162.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 168-69. After being indicted, defendant's attorney filed a motion for continuance in order to secure a psychiatric examination and treatment. Id. at 164. Although the
prosecution did not oppose the motion, no action was taken by the court, and the case proceeded to trial. Id. at 164-65. As trial began, defendant's counsel objected, in part on the
grounds that he was not prepared for trial (having expected a substantial continuance to be
granted) and that his client, who was not "of sound mind," should be given further psychiatric examination before going forward with the trial. Drope, 420 U.S. at 165. The trial
judge explained that the defendant's motion for continuance had been submitted in an
improper form and, with the defendant having failed to file a proper second motion as
promised, the first motion would be therefore overruled and the case would proceed to trial.

Id.
116. Id. The defendant failed to appear for the second day of the trial because he had
shot himself earlier that morning in an apparent attempted suicide. Id. at 166. Defendant's counsel moved for a mistrial, but the trial judge denied the motion, stating that any
difficulties in proceeding with trial were of the defendant's own making. Id. at 167. Defendant's motion for a new trial was denied after the court found that the defendant's absence
from trial was voluntary and that the shooting was done purposely in order to avoid trial.
Drope, 420 U.S. at 167.
117. Id. at 168-69. The relevant rule is Missouri Supreme Court Rule 27.26.
118. Drope, 420 U.S. at 169.
119. Id.

Spring 2009

Indiana v. Edwards

453

the United States then granted certiorari to examine whether or
120
not the defendant's due process rights had been violated.
In examining the issue of competency to stand trial and tracing
the history of the concept through the American court system, the
Drope Court held that, not only must a defendant be able to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him and
consult with counsel, but he must also be able "to assist in preparing his defense" before being tried. 121 This last phrase was an important addition to the language in Dusky, which only required a
defendant to be able to consult with his attorney, rather than actually assist in his own defense.' 22 The Court added that, even
when a defendant is competent to stand trial when the proceedings begin, a change in his condition may occur and render him
23
incompetent to stand trial even after trial has already begun.
In such a situation, the court must be alert to such changes and, if
necessary and despite the difficulties that may result, suspend the
24
trial until the defendant's condition can be properly examined.
Applying these rules, the Court held that, regardless of whether
the defendant should have been given a competency hearing prior
to the start of trial, the compounding effect of the evidence that
came to light before and during trial, including his attempted suicide, created enough doubt as to his competency to require further
investigation of the issue. 125 As a result, the judgment was re126
versed and the case remanded.
While it is a violation of a defendant's constitutional right to due
process of law to try him while mentally incompetent to stand
trial, it is also a constitutional violation to force a lawyer upon a
defendant when he desires to conduct his own defense in a state
criminal trial. 27 Like the issue of mental competence, the right to
self-representation has a long history in American jurisprudence,
with the right to represent oneself in the federal courts being
statutorily established almost contemporaneously with the Consti-

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 171.
Id.
Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402-03.
Drope, 420 U.S. at 181.
Id. at 181-82.
Id. at 180.
Id. at 183.
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
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tution.128 Likewise, the vast majority of States have preserved the
129
same right within their own courts or constitutions.
In Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 130 the United States
Supreme Court examined the narrow issue of whether a defendant
accused of a felony can waive a trial by jury without the assistance
of legal counsel. 13 1 The Court noted that nothing in the Constitution prevents a self-represented defendant from choosing a bench
trial in favor of a jury trial. 132 While the Constitution, the Court
stated, essentially requires that a defendant be able to exercise
informed judgment before pleading guilty or waiving certain
rights, it does not assume that a defendant is automatically incompetent to exercise this judgment unless he is represented by
counsel. 133 Because the Constitution does not explicitly or implicitly recognize a relevant exception, the same must therefore be
true in relation to waiving the right to a jury trial. 134 The Court
held that, broadly stated, the Constitution does not force counsel
on a defendant, and a defendant may waive the right to counsel as
135
long as he does so with an awareness of what he is doing.
While Adams may have answered the question of whether the
Constitution forces a lawyer on a defendant, it did not, according
to the United States Supreme Court, answer the question of
136
whether the Constitution prevents a State from doing the same.
That question was the central issue before the Supreme Court in
128. Faretta,422 U.S. at 812. The right was included in the Judiciary Act of 1789,
which stated that, "in all courts in the United States, the parties may plead and manage
their own causes personally .... " Id. at 806. The right to federal representation was later
codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1948) (Appearance personally or by counsel), which reads, "[in
all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and
conduct causes therein."
129. Faretta,422 U.S. at 813-14.
130. 317 U.S. 269 (1942).
131. Adams, 317 U.S. at 272. In Adams, the defendant, indicted on six counts of mail
fraud, waived the right to counsel at trial. Id. at 270, He then waived the right to a trial
by jury and moved for a bench trial. Id. at 270-71. The defendant was convicted and sentenced, and during the appeal process, eventually acquired the assistance of an attorney.
Id. at 271. At that point, and on the advice of the Circuit Court of Appeals, defendant and
his counsel filed a writ of habeas corpus to ask the question whether a client representing
himself may waive the right to a jury trial. Id. at 271-72. The Circuit Court of Appeals
answered the question negatively and reversed the defendant's conviction. Adams, 317
U.S. at 217-72. The United States Supreme Court then granted certiorari to examine the
question. Id. at 272.
132. Id. at 275.
133. Id. at 277.
134. Id. at 278-79.
135. Id. at 279. As a result, the Circuit Court of Appeals' decision was reversed and the
cause remanded. Id. at 287.
136. Faretta,422 U.S. at 814-15.
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Faretta v. California.137 In attempting to resolve the issue, the
Court looked to certain dicta in Adams, which asserted an affirmative right to represent oneself. 138 The Court looked to other
cases as well, including Snyder v. Massachusetts,"3 9 which held
that the right of an accused to be present at all stages of the proceedings against him, as embodied in the Confrontation Clause of
the Sixth Amendment, was based on the notion that a defense
would be easier if the defendant was not only allowed to be present but also allowed to give advice to or even supersede his coun14
sel in order to defend himself.140 Likewise, in Price v. Johnston, '
the United States Supreme Court recognized that, in holding that
a convicted defendant did not have an absolute right to argue his
own appeal, it was standing in direct contrast to the recognized
right of a defendant to conduct his own defense at trial. 42 The
FarettaCourt also looked to decisions of the United States Courts
137. Id. In Faretta,the defendant had been charged with grand theft in a California
state court. Id. at 807. Counsel was appointed by the court but then reluctantly removed
by the trial judge after being waived by the defendant. Id. at 807-08. Shortly before trial,
however, the judge conducted a hearing to determine if the defendant was able to adequately conduct his own defense. Id. at 808. Finding that he was not, the judge then reassigned counsel, holding also that the defendant had no constitutional right to represent
himself in his own defense. Faretta,422 U.S. at 808-10. The defendant, at trial, was found
guilty and sentenced to prison. Id. at 810-11. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the
conviction, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id. at 811-12.
138. Id. at 815. The relevant passages from Adams state:
The right to assistance of counsel and the correlative right to dispense with a lawyer's help are not legal formalisms. They rest on considerations that go to the substance of an accused's position before the law ....
...What were contrived as protections for the accused should not be turned into fetters ....
To deny an accused a choice of procedure in circumstances in which he,
though a layman, is as capable as any lawyer of making an intelligent choice, is to
impair the worth of great Constitutional safeguards by treating them as empty verbalisms
•.. When the administration of the criminal law ... is hedged about as it is by the
Constitutional safeguards for the protection of an accused, to deny him in the exercise of his free choice the right to dispense with some of these safeguards... is to imprison a man in his privileges and call it the Constitution.
Faretta,422 U.S. at 815-16 (quoting Adams, 317 U.S. at 279-80).
139. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934), overruled in part on other grounds by
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
140. Faretta,422 U.S. at 816 (citing Snyder, 291 U.S. 97). The Sixth Amendment states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
141. 334 U.S. 266 (1948).
142. Id. (citing Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266 (1948)).
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of Appeals for guidance and found that they had, on numerous
occasions, found the right of self-representation to be protected
43
within the Bill of Rights.
After considering all of the relevant decisions, the Court, in
Faretta,found an almost total consensus that a defendant's basic
right to defend himself would be violated by forcing a lawyer upon
him. 144 The Court then turned its eye to the Sixth Amendment,
holding that the amendment does not simply provide that a defense will be made for a defendant, but that a defendant, himself,
has the right to make that defense. 145 The Court noted that, although not explicitly stated in the Sixth Amendment, the right to
self-representation is implied by its structure. 146 While an attorney may be appointed or acquired by the defendant, the Court
went on to explain, he may only represent the accused at the accused's consent, because if the defense presented by the attorney
is not the same as that desired by the accused, then it is logically
not the accused's defense. 147 Therefore, the defense is not, in real48
ity, the defense constitutionally guaranteed to him.
The Faretta Court also traced the history of self-representation
throughout the British and American court systems. 49 The Court
pointed out that, in British history, the oft-criticized Star Chamber of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was the only court
150
that ever forced attorneys upon unwilling criminal defendants.
143. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 816 (citing United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271 (2d Cir.
1964); United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12 (2d Cir 1965); MacKenna v.
Ellis, 263 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1959); United States v. Sternman, 415 F.2d 1165 (6th Cir.
1969); Lowe v. United States, 418 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1969); United States v. Warner, 428
F.2d 730 (8th Cir. 1970); Haslam v. United States, 431 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1970); United
States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Brown v. United States, 264 F.2d 363
(D.C. Cir. 1959)).
144. Faretta,422 U.S. at 817.
145. Id. at 819. See also U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
146. Faretta,422 U.S. at 819.
147. Id. at 820-21.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 821-832.
150. Id. at 821. The Faretta Court described the Star Chamber as follows:
That curious institution, which flourished in the late 16th and early 17th centuries,
was of mixed executive and judicial character, and characteristically departed from
common-law traditions. For those reasons, and because it specialized in trying "political" offenses, the Star Chamber has for centuries symbolized disregard of basic individual rights. The Star Chamber not merely allowed but required defendants to
have counsel. The defendant's answer to an indictment was not accepted unless it
was signed by counsel. When counsel refused to sign the answer, for whatever reason, the defendant was considered to have confessed .... The Star Chamber was
swept away in 1641 by the revolutionary fervor of the Long Parliament.
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By the late seventeenth century, British law had developed the
right to counsel, as well as the corresponding right to selfrepresentation. 15 1 The Court also explained that, in the early
years of the American Colonies, the right to defend oneself was
152
closely guarded, aided in part by a general distrust of lawyers.
This trend began to reverse itself over time, but even so, as the
Court noted, many early colonial charters and declarations of
rights guaranteed the right of self-representation. 53 After the
Declaration of Independence, as the Court explained, this right
was incorporated into many state constitutions and statutes, in
part because it was thought to go hand-in-hand with the right to
counsel. 5 4 The Judiciary Act of 1789, as previously mentioned,
also preserved the right, and it was against this backdrop that the
Sixth Amendment was first proposed. 55 The Court stressed that,
at the time the Sixth Amendment was proposed, no State or colony had forced an attorney on a defendant, and the Court presumed that, had the Sixth Amendment proposed to do away with
the right of self-representation, some controversy or debate would
have arisen, although there is none of record. 156
Furthermore, the Court explained that, although there is undoubtedly some value in proceeding to trial with state-appointed
counsel, there remains the invaluable right to free choice in the
matter. 5 7 Forcing an attorney on a defendant, the Court stated,
only leads the defendant to believe that the law is working against
him, especially since the defendant is the one who has to shoulder
the consequences of unsuccessful representation. 158 Although it
may be obvious, at times, that serving in one's own defense will
only be to the defendant's disadvantage, the choice to do so must
59
still be given out of respect for the defendant as an individual.
Having resolved, in Faretta,that the right of self-representation
is constitutionally guaranteed, the Court applied the law to the
facts of the case and found that, in forcing the defendant to accept
an attorney, the California courts had violated his constitutional

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Faretta,422 U.S. at 824-26 (citing the Treason Act of 1695, 7 Will. 3, c. 3, s 1).
Faretta,422 U.S. at 826-27.
Id. at 828.
Id. at 828-30.
Id. at 831.
Id. at 832.
Faretta,422 U.S. at 833-34.
Id. at 834.
Id.
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right to conduct his own defense. 160 The judgment of the lower
court was therefore vacated and the case remanded.161
Farettawas a 6-3 decision. 162 In the first of two dissenting opinions, Justice Burger, joined by Justice Blackmun and Justice
Rehnquist, argued that no constitutional basis existed for the majority's holding and that the decision was merely an attempt to
constitutionalize what the majority thought was "good."'1 63 The
dissenters found nothing in the Sixth Amendment guaranteeing
the right of self-representation. 164 Instead, the minority explained
that the Sixth Amendment was meant to ensure that criminal defendants receive the best possible defense, and that, in many
cases, this intent can only be realized by the representation of
counsel. 165 A trial judge, the dissent stated, is the best person to
determine whether a defendant is capable of serving in his own
defense and may, therefore, determine that a defendant must accept appointed counsel. 66 The minority disagreed with the majority's use of dicta from other cases and its employment of British
and American court history. 67 Justice Burger also expressed his
concern that allowing a defendant to proceed pro se would prevent
judicial economy because it would cause congestion in the court
system and encourage more appeals from convicted pro se defen68
dants.1
A second dissent, echoing the first, was written by Justice
Blackmun,169 who argued that the Sixth Amendment contained no
language supporting a right to self-representation. 70 Additionally, Justice Blackmun argued that the judicial history cited by
the majority was unpersuasive, and he found that the procedural
confusion caused by self-represented defendants would outweigh
171
any potential advantages.
The two issues of competency to stand trial and a right to self72
representation collided, at least somewhat, in Godinez v. Moran,
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at 835.
Id. at 836.
Faretta,422 U.S. at 807, 836.
Id. at 836 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 837-38.
Id. at 840.
Id.
Faretta,422 U.S. at 840-45 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 845-46.
Id. at 846 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
509 U.S. 389, 113 S. Ct. 2680 (1993).
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in which the United States Supreme Court was presented with the
issue of whether the standard of competency for standing trial is
the same as the standard of competency for waiving counsel or
pleading guilty. 173 In Godinez, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit had held that the standard of competency to
waive constitutional rights, including that of self-representation,
was higher than that of the standard of competency to stand
trial.174 The United States Supreme Court, noting that the question had divided the federal courts of appeals, granted certiorari to
175
examine the issue and resolve the conflict.
The Court, in Godinez, reasoned that all criminal defendants,
whether they plead guilty or not, may have to make difficult and
important decisions once proceedings have been initiated against
them. 76 Although the decision to plead guilty may be a complicated one, it is, according to the Court, no more complicated than
any of the decisions that may need to be made by a defendant who
proceeds to trial. 77 As a result, the Court held, there is no reason
to require a higher level of competence for defendants who plead
guilty than for those who do not.'7 8 The Court, however, clearly
pointed out the distinction between a defendant waiving the right
to appointed counsel and actually representing himself at trial, a
179
distinction that would be repeated in Edwards III.

173. Godinez, 509 U.S. at 391.
174. Id. at 394. The Godinez defendant had entered a Las Vegas bar and shot and killed
two people before stealing the cash register. Id. at 391. Less than two weeks later, he went
to his ex-wife's apartment and shot and killed her. Id. He then attempted suicide by shooting himself in the abdomen and slitting his wrists, but he failed to take his own life. Id.
While recovering at the hospital, he confessed his crimes to the police. Id. Later, the defendant, along with counsel, pleaded not guilty to three counts of first-degree murder.
Godinez, 509 U.S. at 391. The trial court conducted a competency hearing, at which the
defendant was found competent to stand trial. Id. The State then decided to pursue the
death penalty. Id. at 391-92. The defendant appeared in court soon afterward and requested to discharge his counsel and enter a guilty plea on his own in order to prevent the
appearance of mitigating evidence at his sentencing hearing. Id. at 392. The court granted
his request after finding that he had waived his right to counsel "knowingly and intelligently." Id. The defendant was sentenced to death for each of the three murders. Godinez,
509 U.S. at 393. Two of the death sentences were affirmed by the Nevada Supreme Court,
while one was reversed and a life sentence imposed. Id. The defendant filed a petition for
post-conviction relief on the grounds that he was not competent to represent himself. Id.
This petition was denied. Id. He then filed a habeas corpus petition in United States District Court for the District of Nevada, which was denied but then reversed by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals. Id.
175. Id. at 395-96.
176. Id. at 398.
177. Id.
178. Godinez, 509 U.S. at 399.
179. Id. See also EdwardsIII, 128 S.Ct. at 2392.
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The Court, in Godinez, explained that, in addition to finding a
defendant competent to stand trial before allowing him to plead
guilty or waive his right to counsel, a trial court must also determine whether the waiver of such constitutional rights is both
knowing and voluntary. 8 0 Although this additional determination
must be made before any waiver is granted, it is not related to
competence, but is rather a procedural requirement for pleading
guilty. 18' As a result, the Court determined that the competency
standard for either pleading guilty or waiving the constitutional
right to counsel is the same as the competency standard for standing trial. 8 2 The Court therefore reversed the judgment below and
remanded the case for further proceedings. 8 3
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Scalia, wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in Godinez.'8 4 In
addition, a dissenting opinion was written by Justice Blackmun
and joined by Justice Stevens. 8 5 The dissenters argued that the
majority opinion was in contrast to both common sense and precedent. 186 According to the dissent, the standard for competence to
stand trial was designed with the intention of ensuring that a defendant could consult with counsel and assist in preparing a defense.' 87 When counsel for the defendant is waived and no longer
exists, the relevancy of competency to stand trial is therefore, the
dissent argued, no longer of any relevance.' 8 8 Competency for one
purpose is not necessarily competency for another, and therefore,
a separate determination is required to answer the question of
competency to waive counsel. 89
The dissenters also argued that prior case law from the Supreme Court has required competency hearings and a determination to be tailored with specificity to the context and purpose of
the given proceeding. 90 Several cases, the dissenters stated, have
even required separate hearings on the issue of competence to

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Godinez, 509 U.S. at 400.
Id. at 400-01.
Id. at 391.
Id. at 402.
Id. at 402 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Godinez, 509 U.S. at 409 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 412.
Id. at 412-13.
Id. at 413.
Godinez, 509 U.S. at 413 (citing Reese v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312, 314 (1966)).
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waive constitutional rights. 191 Moreover, the dissenters pointed
out that the Court's decision in Faretta,while preserving the right
for a competent defendant to conduct his own defense, did not give
an incompetent defendant that same right. 192 Faretta, the dissenters explained, required the defendant to make the decision to
represent himself knowingly and intelligently, something a mentally incompetent or borderline mentally incompetent defendant
may not be able to do. 19 3 Finally, the dissent took issue with the
majority's attempt to draw a line between competence to waive the
right to counsel and competence to actually represent oneself, arguing that the former necessarily entails the latter. 194 This particular point foreshadowed the seemingly inevitable question
195
raised fifteen years later in Edwards III.
The issue in Edwards III was undoubtedly a complex one, involving not one but two constitutional issues. While compelling
arguments were framed by both the majority and the minority,
the Supreme Court's final holding on the issue was, as a general
principle, correct. The Constitution does not forbid a State from
insisting that a criminal defendant, adjudged competent to stand
trial but not competent to represent himself, proceed to trial with
counsel. 196 However, when specifically applied to Edwards, the
criminal defendant in this case, the Court's ruling was incorrect.
The Court properly held that the Dusky standard of mental
competence is, on its face, inapplicable to a situation like that presented in Edwards III. The Dusky standard, as one of its foundational elements, requires that the defendant have "sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of
rational understanding."'' 97 This requirement automatically precluded applying the standard to a pro se criminal defendant, who
198
has no lawyer.
The Court also found its ruling in Farettainapplicable. 199 It appears, though, that the Court actually could have, and should
have, applied Faretta to reach the same result and resolved the
191. Id. (citing Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105 (1954); Westbrook v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
150 (1966); Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437 (1992); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127
(2002)).
192. Godinez, 509 U.S. at 415-16 (citing Faretta,422 U.S. at 835).
193. Godinez, 509 U.S. at 416.
194. Id.
195. EdwardsIII, 128 S.Ct. at 2384.
196. Id. at 2381.
197. Id. at 2383 (citing Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402) (emphasis in original).
198. EdwardsIII, 128 S. Ct. at 2386.
199. Id. at 2384.
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issue more easily. Farettaestablished that the Constitution guarantees to a criminal defendant the right of self-representation
when that defendant voluntarily and intelligently elects to proceed
without counsel. 20 0 Farettaand its progeny also advanced the rule
20 1
that the right of self-representation is not absolute in all cases.
As the Court correctly stated, mental illness varies by degree,
meaning that an individual who may be competent in some respects can be incompetent in others. 20 2 Thus, it stands to reason
that a defendant found mentally competent to stand trial could
still be found incapable of "voluntarily or intelligently" electing to
represent himself at trial.
Justice Scalia, in his dissent, argued that Edwards made the
20 3
decision to represent himself both voluntarily and intelligently.
Edwards, according to Justice Scalia, was able to answer many of
the trial judge's questions on legal procedure and, on more than
one occasion, made coherent courtroom arguments. 20 4 In addition,
Edwards represented that his desire for self-representation was
motivated by a disagreement with counsel over his defense strategy. 20 5 While his attorney wanted to pursue a defense of lack of
intent to kill, Edwards favored arguing self-defense. 20 6 This difference, at least on its face, represented a reasonable disagreement over two legitimate and recognized criminal defenses, rather
than Edwards's desire to establish an unorthodox defense based
on some insane delusion. Moreover, the trial judge determined
that Edwards had "knowingly and voluntarily" waived his right to
counsel at his first trial and was only prevented from waiving this
right at his second trial because of a new "exception" carved out by
the judge. 20 7 Therefore, considering the facts, it was likely proper
for the trial judge and for Justice Scalia to determine that Edwards's election to waive counsel was done voluntarily and intelligently. As a result, Edwards, under Faretta, had the constitutional right to represent himself at trial. To deny him that right
was error.
However, although the ruling in Edwards III was incorrect as to
Edwards, it was correct as a broader rule of law. As the amicus
200. Faretta,422 U.S. at 807.
201. Edwards III, 128 S. Ct. at 2384 (citations omitted).
202. Edwards III, 128 S. Ct. at 2386.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id. at 2389-91 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2389-90.
Id. at 2390.
Id.

207. Edwards III, 128 S. Ct. at 2390.
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brief filed with the Court by the American Psychiatric Association
pointed out, symptoms of mental illness such as unorganized
thought processes, attention and concentration deficits, anxiety,
and impaired capacity for self-expression "can impair the defendant's ability to play the significantly expanded role required for
self-representation even if he can play the lesser role of represented defendant." 20 8 Accordingly, although a criminal defendant
may meet the Dusky standard and be found competent to stand
trial, he may not have the mental capability to represent himself. 20 9 Standing trial can be, if the defendant so desires, a relatively passive activity, because the defendant can defer to counsel
on any number of decisions or matters of strategy. 2 10 On the other
hand, self-representation puts the defendant in a much more active position, requiring close attention and an ability to comprehend, in much greater detail, what occurs during trial.2 11 Whether
an individual may be able to consult with counsel and assist in his
defense and whether he may be able to serve as counsel and
wholly manage his own defense are therefore two very different
21 2
questions.
In asking the Supreme Court to consider whether the Constitution required that Edwards to be allowed to represent himself at
trial, the State of Indiana also requested that the Court adopt a
more specific standard to deny the right of self-representation and
that the Court overrule Faretta.2 13 Somewhat ironically, however,
it seems as though Farettacould actually serve as this "more specific standard." While there will undoubtedly be a great deal of
legal debate as to how to correctly interpret "voluntarily and
knowingly" or "voluntarily and intelligently" in the context of
mental illness, simply carrying over the existing Farettarule into
cases involving borderline mental competence will allow the Court
to reach its desired result with less reliance on history, tradition,
or psychiatric theory and more reliance on existing precedent.
Courts are routinely asked to apply tests such as these in a variety of settings, and moreover, should already be somewhat familiar with applying the Farettatest in its more traditional context.
208. Id. at 2387 (quoting Brief for APA et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party
at 26, Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379 (2008) (No. 07-208)).
209. Edwards III, 128 S. Ct. at 2386.
210. See Brief for APA et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 20, Indiana v.
Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379 (2008) (No. 07-208).
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. Edwards III, 128 S.Ct. at 2388.
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It is difficult to predict how Edwards III will fare in the future.
The issue is a narrow one and will likely arise again, if at all, only
on rare occasions. First, very few felony criminal defendants actually choose to represent themselves. 214 Of this small number,
even fewer are likely to be found "borderline competent" to stand
trial, as evidenced by the fact that Edwards III, in 2008, was a
case of first impression for the Supreme Court. 2 15 Of course, the
fact that an issue will rarely be raised does not make it unimportant, especially when it involves constitutional rights. Therefore,
it is necessary to examine the breadth of the potential impact or
consequences of the ruling in Edwards III.
The effect of Edwards III on lower courts and legislatures remains yet unclear. State legislatures may draft their own statutes
or procedural rules in an attempt to establish a specific standard
of competence to represent oneself. Of course, it is highly likely
that, upon its first attempted implementation, any such standard
would face a challenge to its constitutionality under Edwards III,
putting the issue again before the Supreme Court. Trial judges
operating under Edwards III may struggle because the Court provided little guidance in determining when they may or should impose counsel on such a defendant. The scientific and psychological
nuances of mental illness are still not wholly understood, particularly by those outside the field of psychiatry, and trial judges cannot therefore be expected to be fully proficient in this area. Reasonable people could easily disagree on whether a borderlinecompetent defendant is capable of representing himself, and as a
result, it is almost impossible for a trial judge to know exactly
where the line stands when it comes to an abuse of judicial discretion. Trial judges are, it is conceded, often asked to become "temporary experts" in a variety of fields by higher court decisions.
Moreover, it is also admittedly unlikely that cases with Edwards
III-like fact patterns will ever arise for most trial judges. Still,
however, the ambiguity inherent in the Court's holding in Edwards III can be expected to create an unwelcome burden on trial
judges throughout the legal system.
There is no easy resolution to the central question in Edwards
III. The case represents a rare collision of multiple constitutional
issues and a field of medicine and science yet to be fully explored
214. Id. (citing Erica Hashimoto, Defending the Right of Self-Representation: An Empirical Look at the Pro Se Felony Defendant, 85 N.C. L. REV. 423, 427, 428, 447 (2007) (noting
that only about .3% to .5% of all felony defendants choose to represent themselves at trial)).
215. Edwards III, 128 S.Ct. at 2383.
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and understood. Advances in research may eventually make it
easier to establish at least a moderately reliable standard for mental competence to represent oneself at trial. In the meantime,
however, the Court has left the legal community with a general
answer that is, although correct, nearly impossible to apply with
any precision. While perhaps not the perfect solution to the problem presented in Edwards III, simply applying the Faretta standard to the facts of the case would have allowed the Court not only
to protect Edwards's rights but also to establish at least a more
specific and workable stopgap standard to be used in any similar
cases going forward.
Patrick Manning

